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In recent years an innovative frame con-
cerning the link between perception and
appreciation of art has been proposed.
This frame has been clearly articulated by
Van de Cruys and Wagerman (2011). An
increasing experimental evidence signifi-
cantly corroborates it. Here we can refer
to the data collected by Muth et al. (2012),
Muth and Carbon (2013) and Carbon and
Hesslinger (2014).
According to Van de Cruys and
Wagerman (2011), the central idea is
that more often than not great artworks
do not allow an immediate and easy
recognition—so that the more fluent
the processing, the higher the appreci-
ation (Bullot and Reber, 2013). On the
contrary, they are creative and innova-
tive, challenging and surprising. They
inhibit ordinary perceptual routines,
violate predictions, involve disorder, dis-
organization, disharmony, ambiguity,
contradictions, indeterminacy, uncer-
tainty, strangeness, and so on. However,
viewers—with a sufficient degree of
expertise (Leder et al., 2014)—often suc-
ceed in establishing a new predictable
pattern on a different level. This transi-
tion from an initial state of uncertainty,
associated with unpleasant and neg-
ative affect, to a subsequent state of
increased predictability and fluency is
highly rewarding. So, aesthetic appreci-
ation is not static, but dynamic. As it is
suggested by the study of Carbon and
Hesslinger (2014), it strongly depends
on the quality of elaboration in terms of
extended, active, deep processing. Besides
increasing familiarity, this elaboration
enables insights into the meanings of
artworks and allows viewers to identify
new patterns.
For the first time recent experiments
concerning the aesthetic appreciation
empirically demonstrate the deep rela-
tionship between perceptual insights and
aesthetic pleasure.
In the first study realized by Muth
et al. (2012), photographs of cubist art-
works by Picasso, Braque, and Gris were
shown to participants without expertise
in cubist art. The study was structured
in two blocks, each showing the stimuli
in a randomized order. During the first
block, subjects had to rate the pictures on
liking. During the second block, subjects
rated how well they could detect objects
within the artwork. All ratings were chosen
from a 7-point-Likert-scale from 1 (“not at
all”) to 7 (“very”). Data across participant
revealed a strong relationship between
the detectability of objects and liking,
confirming that also in aesthetic percep-
tion form recognition is closely related to
appreciation.
In the second study realized by Muth
and Carbon (2013), two-tone images
either containing a hidden form (i.e., a
face) or not were repeatedly presented
for half a second to participants. Stimuli
were shown in a randomized order block-
wise 13 times. The tasks alternated block-
wise between choosing from a 7-point
scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very
good”) how much one liked the picture
and a detecting block. The latter com-
prised two ratings on a 1 plus 7-point
scale (0: “no face recognized”; 7: “very
clear”). Insight was defined by the highest
gain in clearness between two subsequent
blocks per participant and stimulus. All
liking ratings per participant and block
were then shifted in regard to their tem-
poral occurrence relative to the insight
block. Data clearly demonstrated that lik-
ing only significantly increased after hav-
ing an insight; the intensity of insight,
defined as degrees of clearness ratings,
showed direct influences on the degrees of
liking.
In my perspective, the important frame
of the aesthetic dis/fluency can be both
refined and extended so that it can
gain an higher explanatory power. I pro-
pose two theoretical hypothesis. They are
not derived from experimental evidence
directly concerning aesthetic experience.
However, these hypothesis are suggested
by what we already know about rele-
vant mechanisms and functions of the
so-called “affective mind” (Hatano et al.,
2000)—an interdisciplinary field of study
in cognitive sciences dedicated to “hot”
phenomena, such as affect, bodily sensa-
tions, pleasure and displeasure, emotions,
mood, and so on.
First, we can refine the conception
of the (“early”) aesthetic pleasure associ-
ated with a single insight into a deter-
mined pattern. From this point of view,
it is very plausible that this kind of aes-
thetic pleasure does not represent only
a phenomenal signal concerning the spe-
cific, already achieved, Gestalt formation.
On the contrary, it signals at the same
time that there is more, that other pro-
cesses of integration are available. It indi-
cates that the artwork enacts a higher
potential of integration, that it enables
a complex network of cues, associations,
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and meanings allowing further cycles
of explorations—precisely what happens
with the Cubist paintings. In this way
the aesthetic pleasure contributes to guid-
ing the subsequent exploration of the art-
work, facilitating the more promising lines
of scrutiny, the positively rewarded ones.
In this perspective, the aesthetic plea-
sure is undoubtedly a function of the
quality of elaboration, but it is differ-
ent in kind from the affective reward
that follows problem solving. It does
not constitute only a post factum sub-
jective reaction of satisfaction, a pas-
sive gratification merely prompted by the
identification of a new recognizable pat-
tern. The aesthetic pleasure is a crucial
component of the aesthetic processing
dynamics because it provides an essential
anticipatory function.
A next step in empirical research on
the perception of art might be the study
of this anticipatory function. However, in
virtue of this property the aesthetic plea-
sure seems to be very similar to the so-
called “feelings of knowing” (or “knowing
feelings”). This kind of feelings are subjec-
tive experiences accompanying thought.
They are automatically elicited by internal
and experiential cues associated with the
ongoing processing dynamics. Individuals
tacitly consult them as signals concerning
the state of their knowledge and implicitly
produce intuitive metajudgments in the
form: “I feel that I know/retrieve/learn x”
(Koriat, 2000; Schwarz and Clore, 2007).
Aesthetic pleasure and feelings of knowing
are both high-order phenomenal signals
grounded in and function of the first-order
processing experience of the subjects. They
are both not conceptual, not analytical,
not verbal, not systematic, and not delib-
erate cues that accompany elaboration and
influence it, mediating the allocation of
attention, time, and effort. With a crucial
difference: the feelings of knowing usu-
ally are determined by the properties of
the availability heuristics (the immediacy
of recognition, the direct accessibility of
pertinent information, the ease with which
the information comes to mind, the famil-
iarity of the stimulus, the fluency of the
processing). On the contrary, when it is
prompted by great artworks, the aesthetic
pleasure is often determined a dis/fluent
processing.
Secondly, we can extend the con-
ception of the (“late”) aesthetic plea-
sure associated with multiple cycles of
insights. From this point of view, great
artworks provide an optimal amount of
(un)predictability, neither too much (dis-
turbing), nor too little (annoying). This
amount of (un)predictability is embod-
ied in a pool of micro-rewards hid-
den in the artwork (Van de Cruys and
Wagerman, 2011). So the aesthetic appre-
ciation does not increase in a linear and
progressive fashion: new challenges will
initially involve unpleasant experiences.
However, according to the experimental
evidence collected about the phenomenon
of mood—an overall and pervasive affec-
tive state, produced by a set of implicit and
tacit appraisals (Forgas, 2007)—we might
also expect that, during the interpretation
of a great artwork, when the viewer has
already solved a certain quantity of dif-
ficulties, he begins to feel good. Even if
the process of interpretation is still open
and he has to face other challenges, we
might expect that he begins to have a pos-
itive mood, determined by the previous
series of insights and rewards. Enhancing
this diffuse and enduring positive affect,
great artworks can support and stimulate
viewers’ further explorations even when
the degree of discrepancy is significantly
high or discrepancy remains temporarily
unsolved.
In line with this proposal, it is possi-
ble that the perception of art is associated
with two different, intertwined kinds of
aesthetic pleasure. The early aesthetic plea-
sure, correlated to the specific challenges
of the dis/fluency process and active since
the early insights. The late aesthetic plea-
sure, correlated to the dis/fluency process
as such and active only after a certain
amount of insights. Another step in future
research in experimental aesthetics might
be the study of the late aesthetic pleasure
and its interaction with the early aesthetic
pleasure.
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